by Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan prompted by a toxic ‘warrior culture’ – as opposed to professional soldiering – Renic might want to reconsider or qualify the term ‘warrior ethos.’ Chapter 4 expands further on the debate between traditionalism/contractarianism and revisionism, with relation to radically asymmetric violence within the confines of structural risk.

Part III takes a historical overview of consecutive challenges to symmetry in war, including military sniping (Chapter 5), manned aerial bombing (Chapter 6), and UAV-exclusive violence (Chapter 7). Renic concludes that, whereas sniping and manned aerial bombing have become mainstream and ethically accepted means of warfare, drones distinctly undermine the structural reciprocal risk that characterizes war, dehumanizing the enemy, eroding the warrior ethos, and moving war closer to extra-judicial punishment. However, the author envisages a possible normalization of UAVs in the near future.

Finally, in his ‘Conclusion’ Renic calls for a reformulation of the laws of war in light of the challenge of radical asymmetry, even though the legal dimensions of drone warfare are not studied in this work, as announced in the Introduction. (p. 9) Ultimately, the author forecasts a moral relaxation of the use of drones as more armies acquire them.

Renic’s *Asymmetric Killing* is one of 2020’s most significant contributions to the field of the Just War Tradition, as it advances the debate on killing in war skillfully balancing theoretical thinking, historical perspective, and practical awareness.

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Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen’s edited volume, *Russia in the Changing International System*, seeks to answer several important questions surrounding Russia’s foreign policy and status within the evolving global system. These questions relate to, *inter alia*, Russia’s status as a great vs. a rising power; Russia’s motives in and perceptions of the system; whether or not, and how, Russia’s views offer an alternative vision of the system; and how Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria, for instance, reflect Russian views and vision of the system. As a whole, the volume claims that Russia is playing a dual role - of both a great power and a rising power, that it proposes a view of world order that is in contrast with that of the West’s, and that it

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undertakes a mixed approach to multilateralism. In order to explain these claims and address the questions above, the volume covers an array of issues facing Russia: its actions in Ukraine and Syria; its relations with China, the Middle East, Europe, and Eurasia; its participation in regional and multilateral institutions (e.g., Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO], Eurasian Economic Union [EAEU], and the Brazil, Russia, India, China [BRICS] group); and its views toward emerging political independence movements.

The editors contend that Russia should be viewed as both a great and a rising power simultaneously. Russia’s vast territory, energy resources, nuclear arsenal, and permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) illustrate qualities of a Great Power while its shrinking population and array of economic challenges undermine its potential as a global force. At the same time, Russia can be seen as a rising power given its involvement in an array of regional and multilateral institutions, its economic status vis-à-vis similar countries, and the similarities it shares with other countries in seeking to counter the Western-led world order. It is argued that this ‘duality’ of roles offers Russia the opportunity to pursue different policies depending on its particular objectives. Thus, for instance, on security issues, Russia performs as a Great Power while on governance and economic issues it acts more as a rising power.

Furthermore, in terms of how Russia views the Western-led international order, the editors rightly contend that Russia seeks to counter Western values and norms as, in Russia’s view, they trample the principle—important to Russia—of respecting state sovereignty and not interfering in others’ affairs. Thus, Russia seeks to revise the international order to one that respects the principles of sovereignty, spheres of influence, and balance of power arrangements. Russia also advocates for more multilateral agreements and approaches to crises to minimise what it perceives as unilateral Western actions that it sees as destabilising, like, for example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

These arguments are explored and supported throughout the volume. For instance, one chapter, written by Marcin Kaczmarski, explores what he considers to be an informal division of labor between Russia and China whereby Russia has been, until recently, concentrating on global security issues whereas China has focused more on economic, financial, and environmental concerns. However, Kaczmarski rightly notes that this division of labor is evolving, with China taking on an increased role in global security governance. Another chapter, by Emre Iseri and Volkan Ozdemir, describes how Russia has been pursuing different policies on either side of its Eurasian landmass—increasing its ties with China and the Asia-Pacific, while simultaneously advancing an aggressive policy against Western interests as illustrated by its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2013-present).

Sergii Glebov examines how, despite UN and Western sanctions and criticism, Russia was essentially able to get away with its annexation of Crimea, and with fomenting unrest in eastern Ukraine. As Glebov rightly points out, Russia’s stance toward NATO and the EU has become more hardened against what it perceives as expansion toward Russia’s borders and into its sphere of influence. In doing so, Russia has attempted to shift blame to the West for its actions in Ukraine and Georgia as it perceives Western encroachment into these regions as a threat to its security. Russia’s revised military doctrine and national security strategy, for instance, highlight its perception of what it considers NATO’s encroachment toward Russia’s borders and NATO’s assumption of global, rather than regional responsibilities, as direct threats. Additionally, Russia has used these actions to build a narrative for its domestic audience, according to which Russia is under threat and must be ready to respond. Indeed, Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrated that it takes seriously what it perceives as threats to its interests – or, more precisely, what the leadership perceives as threats to its hold on power.
Moreover, Glebov argues that the more the international community tries to isolate and/or sanction Russia, the greater the chance that Russia may respond more aggressively in the future, thereby indicating a likely no-end-in-sight to worsening tensions between Russia and the West. While this point is often debated in policy circles, Glebov is correct in that the West must better understand Russia’s threat perceptions in order to be best prepared to respond to any Russian actions.

Similarly, a chapter by Regina Heller, claims that Russia’s coercive policies, as well as failure to adhere to its principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention, have led Russia to lose control of Ukraine and broader influence in the former Soviet space. A chapter by Victor Jeifets and Nikolay Dobronravin illustrates how Russia’s policy toward independence movements has evolved since its support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—related to its 2008 war with Georgia—as well as in eastern Ukraine. In a chapter about Russian policy in the Middle East, Alexey Khlebnikov contends that the Kremlin is mostly focused upon security (e.g., countering terrorism) and economic issues (e.g., energy cooperation and arms sales), as well as countering what it sees as destabilizing Western interventions. In particular, he describes the evolving changes in the Middle East since 2010, including the Arab Spring and subsequent regime changes, the emergence of new power centers (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey), the worsening Syrian civil war, and how Russia has been able to increase its role in the region. Khlebnikov rightly describes Russia’s concern with the ‘color revolutions’ that had taken place in former Soviet states in the early 2000s, and its views of the Arab Spring as part of a Western attempt at regime change.

Jeanne Wilson, reviewing Russia’s goals and motivations, observes that Russia supports multipolarity and participation in regional organizations, in order to counter the Western-led world order, to demonstrate its Great Power potential, and to bolster domestic legitimacy. She argues that the Kremlin takes a dual approach to its participation in these organizations—to both expand influence in the post-Soviet space and to counter Western norms and values that Russia believes have infiltrated these institutions. Hence, Russia uses these multilateral organizations to improve its ability to exert influence and enhance its status, or perceptions of such status, globally and domestically.

Philipp Casula’s essay examines the tools employed by Russia in both Crimea and Syria. Casula rightly argues that Russia’s actions do not represent a new form of warfare. Rather, in his view, Russia is simply utilizing all tools—both kinetic and non-kinetic—which are at the disposal of every state. For example, within the former Soviet space, it is claimed that Russia particularly emphasizes ‘biopolitics’ by exploiting Russia’s cultural, historic, linguistic, and other ties with compatriots and others who may identify with the Russky Mir. Outside the former Soviet space, Russia emphasizes the notion of respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention. Casula defines biopolitics as a ‘de-territorialized form of power that transgresses the borders’ (p. 217). In this sense, Russia has justified its actions in its Near Abroad (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine) by arguing that these actions were needed to defend and protect the rights of Russian compatriots. As such, the Near Abroad—given the number of Russian compatriots resident in these domains—is of critical importance to Russia. Casula also contends that the Kremlin advocates for stability over democracy in its foreign policy (as well as domestic policy), and that Russia is especially concerned with what it perceives as NATO and EU encroachment toward its borders and towards what it perceives as its historic sphere of influence. Relatedly, Russia considers this encroachment, coupled with Western support for democratic movements—often referred to as ‘color revolutions’—as Western attempts to overthrow existing regimes. Hence, the Kremlin places significant emphasis on the concept of sovereignty and non-interference. For instance, in the case of Syria, Russia considers its
intervention as legitimate given that the Asad regime invited Russia to intervene militarily and this intervention was also legitimized domestically by the Kremlin, contending that it was saving fellow Christians.

Russia in the Changing International System is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on Russia’s foreign policy and worldview. As such, it is important reading for scholars and practitioners alike, especially to better understand Russia’s worldview and what it perceives as major threats—NATO and EU expansion, a Western-led world order, Western unilateral military actions, and Western support of ‘color revolutions’. Particular strengths of this volume are its description of Russia’s duality as both a rising and a great power, its reminder of what Russia perceives as threats, and how it justifies its responses to these threats.

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* It should be noted that the views expressed in this review reflect the personal opinions of the author and are entirely the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government. USAID is not responsible for the accuracy of any information supplied herein.