

Arms Trade in Remote Warfare: Pollinating Global Terror

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Introduction

In remote warfare, countries conduct military operations against a remote threat or adversary. Due to its light footprint on the ground and the use of the host country's state or non-state forces, it is widely believed that remote warfare is economical in terms of cost and manpower. However, arms traded to host countries in remote warfare often fall into terrorists' hands because of the weak control and monitoring mechanisms. These arms are used by terrorist groups and non-state actors to perpetrate human rights violations in host countries. Conflict and human suffering in host countries create waves of migration into developed countries. In the guise of immigrants, affiliates of international terrorist organisations also reach developed countries.

Exploitable immigrants and international terrorist organisations who gain access to diverted arms of past wars and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) high tech equipment can be used by modern conventional adversaries to conduct 'Counter Remote Warfare' in developed countries, particularly in Eastern Europe.

This paper establishes a relationship between remote warfare, arms trade, arms misuse and diversion, immigration, terrorism and modern conventional adversary. This paper argues that, in its present form, the arms trade in remote warfare is 'pollinating terror'. Remote warfare can only be useful if arms transfers are regulated and monitored by better provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as proposed in this paper. The prevention of misuse and diversion of arms will reduce human rights violations in host countries and moderate the displacement of people. This will have a considerable effect on reducing migration flows to developed countries and curb opportunities for international terrorist organisations to 'cross-pollinate terror'.

What is Remote Warfare?

Remote warfare is an approach in which friendly forces conduct military operations without direct or with minimum contact with the adversary or threat at remote locations. The operations can be unilateral or joint. Unilateral operations include the use of air strikes, aerial bombing, aircraft carriers, combat helicopters and armed drones. Joint operations usually involve defence collaboration with the host state or support to non-state groups to seek the desired effects. This type of warfare has been practised by the UK, such as the operations with Special Forces which do not require parliamentary authorisation. Therefore, in areas where the UK is not formally at war, Special Forces as well as military advisers, intelligence capabilities, and military training teams are deployed.¹ Owing to their light footprint on the ground, British troops are kept out of harm's way or exposed to acceptable minimum danger.² It is commonly believed that remote warfare is economical; however, due to the lack of clarity on budgets, it is hard to confirm the cost effectiveness of remote warfare programme.³

Complexity in Fighting Remote Wars

Countries engaged in remote warfare have a complex relationship with the host states. Militarily, this relationship involves arms trade and supply, training and mentoring, joint planning and intelligence sharing. Many a time, remote warfare is fought at places where the host government's structures are inadequate and democracy is feeble. It is often the case that various local non-state, sub-state, sectarian, and anti-state actors, whose interests are divergent from those of the host state, exude a strong influence in these states.

In certain cases, where the government of the host state is the real adversary, these actors offer possibilities for an alliance against the state. For example, the British remote warfare operations in Kurdistan and Syria now include a growing number of such non-

¹ Emily Knowles, 'We Need to Talk about Yemen', Briefing (Remote Control/Oxford Research Group, December 2016), p. 4.

² Emily Knowles & Abigail Watson, *Remote Warfare: Lessons Learned from Contemporary Theatres* (Oxford Research Group/ Remote Warfare Programme, 2018), p. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

state actors as the Peshmerga or Syrian Democratic Forces.⁴ Also, as Amos Harel reports, seven Sunni rebel organisations in Syria are receiving arms and ammunition from Israel, along with the funds to buy additional armaments to fight the Syrian Army.⁵

However, local non-state actors sought out by the friendly forces are not always reliable. Their motives, affiliations, and long-term objectives are hard to decipher. History shows that military support provided to non-state actors often ends up with the wrong side due to theft, raid, smuggling, deliberate diversion or resale of such weaponry. A report by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) has traced cases in which the weapons retrieved from ISIS were originally supplied to the Syrian rebels by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. These include anti-tank guided weapons and several varieties of rocket with tandem warheads, designed to defeat modern reactive armour.⁶ There are also historical instances when the right side at one time became the wrong side another time due to changing interests and alliances. A report by Oxford Research Group 'Remote Warfare Programme' finds that contemporary British military activity is not sufficiently integrated into an overarching political strategy. The report explains that the necessity to conduct an immediate counter terrorism campaign in Iraq and Syria, without Western troops on the ground, has led to the empowerment of regional actors like Peshmerga - which can have severe consequences for stability.⁷ Knowles highlights this issue: 'It is a truth rarely acknowledged that we are fighting alongside and against groups in regions where they have entrenched interests and complex strategic priorities. This invariably means that, in a battle of enduring political will, Western militaries are unlikely to come out on top.'⁸

⁴ Emily Knowles & Abigail Watson, *Lawful but Awful? Legal and Political Challenges of Remote Warfare and Working with Partners* (Oxford Research Group/ Remote Warfare Programme, 2018), p. 6.

⁵ Amos Harel, 'To Push Iran Back, Israel Ramps up Support for Syrian Rebels, "Arming 7 Different Groups"', in *Haaretz*, 21 February 2018, online at <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/with-eye-on-iran-israel-increases-military-support-for-syrian-rebels-1.5826348> (Here and subsequently, all internet links were last accessed on 12 May 2019).

⁶ Conflict Armament Research, *Weapons of the Islamic State: A Three Year Investigation in Iraq and Syria* (Conflict Armament Research, 2017), p. 6.

⁷ Remote Warfare Programme Submission, 'The JCNSS Inquiry on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund', in *Oxford Research Group* (October, 2018), p.3.

⁸ Knowles & Watson, 'Remote Warfare', p. 29.

Remote or similar type of warfare, with too much dependency on multiple untrustworthy actors and a loose control over consequences, often becomes unbalanced and can lead to problems in international security. The CAR report details the cases in which weapon supplier states were targeted by the forces that they armed indirectly.⁹ The report establishes that there exists an inherent contradiction in supplying weapons into armed conflicts in which multiple competing and overlapping non-state armed groups operate. It is hard to control over which groups ultimately gain custody of weapons.¹⁰ Knowles questions the belief that the engagement in the light footprint remote warfare will automatically result in durable improvements while incurring low monetary and political costs. Instead, without sustained investment (in terms of troops) gains can quickly be reversed.¹¹

*Arms Diversion and Immigration Duo:
Sowing and Pollinating Terror*

Due to the internationalisation of threat, stockpiles of one war can become available to the adversary's forces in another war in a different location. The CAR report mentioned above also highlights that ISIS deployed weapons and ammunition in Syria that originated in other conflict-affected regions. Such cross-conflict transfers include weapons diverted to Syria and Iraq from Libyan national stockpiles and militants in South Sudan. Ironically, the rockets used by ISIS had the same lot numbers as the rockets that were originally shipped to the U.S. from Eastern European states and were earlier traced in Somalia.¹²

The global reach and networks of extremist organisations such as IS and Al-Qaida with drug cartels, weapon smugglers, and black market dealers ensure that the right kind of weapon is available to counter friendly forces' operations anywhere in the world. The CAR report demonstrates that IS forces are adept at tapping into regional and international commercial markets to acquire chemical precursors and off-the-shelf products for the development of weapons. Combined with demonstrated logistical and organisational capacity, and willing recruits around the world, they possess a sound

⁹ Conflict Armament Research, *Weapons of the Islamic State*, p. 146.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹¹ Knowles & Watson, 'Remote Warfare', p. 29.

¹² Conflict Armament Research, *Weapons of the Islamic State*, p. 7.

capability to conduct insurgency and terrorist acts well beyond their local regions.¹³

Past wars' diverted arms are stockpiled by dealers and sold in the European black market. In Sweden, weapons from the Bosnian and Serbian wars are flowing into immigrant neighbourhoods. For example, the grenades (rusted due to long storage) are given in gratis on purchase of an AK-47. In Sweden, the black market price of a hand grenade is 100 kroner, which is roughly only 12 dollars.¹⁴ In his incisive article on the terrorist threat in Italy, Groppi warns about terrorists and their sympathisers' involvement in crimes, counterfeiting documents, arms and drugs trafficking, and the facilitation of illegal immigration in European countries.¹⁵

Due to the displacement of people from war-ravaged countries and the influx of immigrants into developed countries, the outreach of rogue networks has expanded. Disguised as immigrants, members of terrorist organisations infiltrate developed countries to prepare and conduct terrorist attacks. For example, the attacks in Paris (13th November 2015) and Brussels (22nd March 2016) were conducted in response to the air raids on ISIS positions in Syria and Iraq.¹⁶ A BBC report mentions that more than one million refugees have entered Germany since 2015, due to Germany's open-door policy. These migrants have fled war and human rights abuses in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and are contributing to increasing violent crimes in Germany. Sexual assaults on the New Year's Eve in 2015 in Cologne by immigrants from the Middle East and Africa is yet another such case.¹⁷

Figure 1 presents my concept of the 'pollination of terror'. Arms traded under the remote warfare programme are diverted to

¹³ Ibid., p.147.

¹⁴ Ellen Barry and Christina Anderson, 'Hand Grenades and Gang Violence Rattle Sweden's Middle Class', in *The New York Times*, 3 March 2018, online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/europe/sweden-crime-immigration-hand-grenades.html>.

¹⁵ Michele Groppi, 'The Terror Threat to Italy: How Italian Exceptionalism is Rapidly Diminishing', in *Combatting Terrorism Centre*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 2017), pp. 20-28.

¹⁶ Tomasz Bąk, 'The Wave of Migration in Europe as a Cause of Terrorist Threat', in *International conference Knowledge-Based Organisation*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2016), pp. 1-9.

¹⁷ BBC Report, 'Germany: Migrants "May have Fuelled Violent Crime Rise"', in *BBC News*, 3 January 2018, online at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42557828>.

international terrorist organisations and also misused in host countries by dictators, authoritarian regimes or non-state actors. The figure shows the connection of international terrorist organisations with local insurgents and terrorists. Human rights abuses and conflict in host countries, in turn, cause mass migration of people from war torn areas. The figure also shows how immigration is connected with rogue organisations in developed countries. Foreign terrorists use immigration as a tool to gain access to western countries.




Figure 1: Arms Trade in Remote Warfare, Misuse & Diversion of Arms and Immigration

Counter Remote Warfare: Nexus of Conventional and Sub-conventional Terror. A Cross Pollination Case

For conventional adversaries, the internationalisation of threats due to migration and availability of illegal arms is a golden opportunity. A nexus of terrorists, radical communities, crime gangs, weapon smugglers and a conventional adversary can be extremely devastating, especially when this adversary is a neighbour.

A combined threat of conventional and sub-conventional warfare is emanating for the Eastern European countries from its neighbourhood. NATO allies envisage a scenario in which Russian forces could invade Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States, reaching

cities such as Riga in Latvia in mere two days. In such a scenario, NATO or coalition forces might have to engage in urban warfare against Russians to preclude a fait accompli and a cost-effective success.¹⁸ In this case, a modern adversary will be in a position to sabotage the national will by deploying non-state actors as its proxies besides opening an auxiliary conventional front.

The Modern adversary will be using artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned aerial platforms, swarm drones, cyber and robotic warfare and can supply them to home insurgents. In urban areas, these capabilities can be easily launched from ventilation windows, tunnels, slums rooftops and underground dugouts. Apart from friendly deployments, these technologies will be targeting civilians to make them wary of friendly forces. Commercial off the shelf (COTS) cyber warfare tools, drones and AI systems can be used anonymously through the conventional adversary's non-state proxies to conduct "counter remote warfare" operations.




Figure 2: Cross Pollination of Global Terror & Counter Remote Warfare

¹⁸ Gian Gentile et al., *Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the US Army* (RAND Corporation, 2017), p. 60.

Figure 2 above shows the connection of the conventional adversary with the host state and non-state groups, including immigrants, international terrorist organisations, rogue agents and authoritarian regimes. The connection is financial, logistic, political and moral. The partnership of the conventional adversary with international terrorists and sub-conventional forces in developed countries creates a wide space for conducting counter remote warfare. The counter remote warfare may include crime, target killing, sabotage, subversion, political violence and can even escalate to urban insurgency. COTS high tech equipment and the arms of past wars in developed countries can be easily supplied to target areas (especially in the context of European open borders) for carrying out sabotage activities.

Is Remote Warfare Programme Counter Productive?

I have therefore suggested that, in its present shape, remote warfare is counter-productive. Practitioners of remote warfare can consider two options: they can either stop engaging in remote warfare or ensure the prevention of misuse and diversion of arms. Inevitably, the nature of existing threats, new challenges, and the changing geopolitical environment make it impossible to disengage from remote warfare completely. Neither it is possible to enforce arms control unilaterally, without the involvement of all or most important global actors. Therefore, the only option is to strengthen the global arms control policy.

The Problem Lies Here: Regulating Arms Transfers in Remote Warfare

As I have demonstrated, arms trade has had a bad historical record. The diversion of arms to adversaries and perpetrators of violence has led to conflicts and human rights violations in some cases. It has been argued that the poor regulation of arms trade is the main cause of irresponsible arms transfers. Clair da Silva points out that poorly regulated transfer of conventional weaponry, munitions and equipment cause 'serious violations of international human rights law, fuel armed conflict, destabilise countries and regions and undermine socio-economic development efforts'.¹⁹

¹⁹ Clair da Silva, 'Creating a Human Rights Standard for the Arms Trade Treaty', in

The Solution – An Arms Trade Treaty

Historically, the production and transfer of conventional weapons were controlled only through UN embargos, transparency agreements like the UN Register of Conventional Arms, or through voluntary codes of conduct and regional agreements.²⁰ Unlike weapons of mass destruction and land mines, trade in conventional weapons was not subject to any legally binding global treaty. It was as late as the 1990s when the idea of a global Arms Trade Treaty was proposed by several NGOs and gradually became accepted by the UN member states.²¹ The ATT process was then formally launched in 2006 and was finally approved by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in April 2013, with an overwhelming majority of member states.

The ATT endeavours to regularise international trade in conventional arms by adopting some legally binding measures. The ATT obliges member states to monitor their arms imports and exports strictly, ensuring that weapons do not end up being used for human rights violations, including terrorism.²² According to the ATT, 'Member states, with the assistance of the U.N, will put into place enforceable, standardised arms import and export regulations and track the destination of exports to ensure they do not end up in the wrong hands'.²³ Article 11 of the ATT obliges the state party to take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in accordance with international law, if it detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms.²⁴ According to this article, diversion

Disarmament Forum (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2009), pp. 27-36.

²⁰ Marta Latek, 'The Arms Trade Treaty Finally an outcome and what next?', in *Library Briefing Library of European Parliament* (2013), p. 1.

²¹ Daniel Mack and Brian Wood, 'Civil Society and the Drive towards an Arms Trade Treaty', in *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research* (February, 2009), pp. 3-4.

²² PILPG, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Key Principles Limiting Trade to Human Rights Violating States', in *Peace Negotiations Post-Conflict Constitutions War Crimes Prosecution* (July, 2015), pp. 39-43.

²³ Nicole Pontius, 'Informative Quotes on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)', in *Camcode Double Bar Code Association*, 9 December 2014, online at <https://www.camcode.com/asset-tags/50-quotes-on-the-arms-trade-treaty>.

²⁴ Andrew Clapham et al., *The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 342.

refers to the process by which arms are delivered to an unauthorised end user or put to an unauthorised end use.²⁵ Under the ATT, exports of conventional arms are not allowed if there is an overriding risk that they can be used in serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law.²⁶

*The Solution Inside-Out: The Arms Trade Treaty
Policy/ Practice Gaps. - The Wind won't Care*

However well-intentioned the theory behind the ATT is, the practical reality of arms trade is different. Research shows that there are always some policy-practice gaps. Lawrence Marzouk and other writers have pointed out that weapons continue to pour into Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey fuelling the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. Supplier countries still grant export licences to these four countries, despite the ample evidence that many weapons end up in Syria. Supplier countries often turn a blind eye to the diversion or misuse of arms because of the substantial profits involved in arms trade. Saudi Arabia alone has accounted for 27% (or £10.3 billion) of British military exports over the last decade, making it the UK arms industry's biggest customer.²⁷ An Amnesty International press release in April 2014 has shown that some states, including the EU members, continue to transfer arms to countries where there is a clear risk of serious human rights violations.²⁸

*The Problem Remains: Continuation of Abuse
despite the Treaty – The Bees won't Listen*

²⁵ Sarah Parker (ed.), *The Arms Trade Treaty: A Practical Guide to National Implementation* (Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2016), p. 118.

²⁶ Press Release, 'Geneva: As Global Arms Trade Surges, States Greenlight Reckless, Harmful Deals' in *Amnesty International*, q1 September 2017, online at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/geneva-as-global-arms-trade-surges-states-greenlight-reckless-harmful-deals>.

²⁷ Richard Reeve, *The UK Military in the Arabian Peninsula* (Oxford Research Group/ Sustainable Security Programme, 2018), p. 5.

²⁸ Press Release, 'UN: Atrocities Fuelled by Inaction on Arms Trade Treaty Promises' in *Amnesty International*, 1 April 2014, online at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2014/04/un-atrocities-fuelled-inaction-arms-trade-treaty-promises>.

In recent times, there have been cases of gross violations of the ATT by some important member states which cannot be ignored. Human rights activists have reported that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has used UK-made cluster bombs in Yemen in areas with high concentration of civilians, such as schools, hospitals and markets.²⁹ The UK has been criticised for not abiding by the ATT by selling these cluster bombs to the KSA. The public reaction to this was quite extreme. Andrew Mitchell, a British MP, has warned that, by assisting Saudi Arabia in its intervention in Yemen, the UK is breeding 'a new generation of terrorists' at home.³⁰ According to an Amnesty International report, France, the UK, and Italy have supplied Egypt with a range of conventional weapons, including light arms and ammunition that can be used for internal repression.³¹ Brian Castner cites a report according to which the US government failed to prevent its weapons and ammunition from being diverted to an ISIS munitions factory, despite having secretly trained and armed Syrian rebels from 2013 to mid-2017. This is a clear case of non-compliance with the ATT, of which the US is one of the signatories.³²

Effectiveness of the Solution: Enforcement of the ATT

Some analysts have termed global arms trade as flawed as there are no formal mechanisms to punish those who break the law.³³ Brian

²⁹ Rachael Revesz, 'UK Bombs Sold to Saudi Arabia Contributed to "81 Unlawful Attacks In Yemen", Say Human Rights Activists', in *The Independent*, 6 June 2017, online at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saudi-arabia-yemen-uk-bombs-sold-arms-deal-used-unlawful-attacks-claims-a7776071.html>.

³⁰ Tom Peck, 'UK Arms to Sales to Saudi are "Breeding a New Generation of Terrorists"', in *The Independent*, 17 January 2017, online at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-arms-to-sales-to-saudi-are-breeding-a-new-generation-of-terrorists-a7531096.html>.

³¹ News Report, 'Geneva: As Global Arms Trade Surges, States Greenlight Reckless, Harmful Deals', in *Amnesty International*, 11 September 2017, online at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/geneva-as-global-arms-trade-surges-states-greenlight-reckless-harmful-deals>.

³² Brian Castner, 'Exclusive: Tracing ISIS' Weapons Supply Chain—Back to the US', in *Wired*, 12 December 2017, online at <https://www.wired.com/story/terror-industrial-complex-isis-munitions-supply-chain>.

³³ Aubrey Belford, Joshua Futersak & Lawrence Marzouk, 'Arms Exports to Middle East: A Question of Legality', in *Balkan Insight*, 27 July 2016, online at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/arms-exports-to-middle-east-a-question-of-legality-07-26-2016>.

Wood, Head of Arms Control and Human Rights at Amnesty International say that there must be zero tolerance for states who think that they can pay lip service to the ATT. To Wood, it is absolutely alarming when states signatory of the ATT continue to supply arms to forces known to commit and facilitate war crimes.³⁴ According to Marta Latek, the effective implementation of the ATT is difficult because of 'lack of common enforcement mechanism, a standardised system of authorisation, and no clarity on any end-use of monitoring measures'.³⁵

Way Out: An Engineered Pollination - Redrawing the Remote Warfare Programme and Introducing Enforcement and Monitoring Mechanisms in Arms Trade

At the end, a simple historical analogy can be drawn on remote warfare. CIA spent millions of dollars to arm and train Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets. Two decades later, it reaped what it sowed through an exorbitant Global War on Terror declared against the same Mujahedeen who were rebranded as Afghan Taliban.³⁶ Taking heed from this example, to prevent the pollination of global terror, remote warfare programme requires a major overhaul in terms of arms trade and cooperation. To ensure the prevention of misuse and diversion of arms, signatories of the ATT need to be more compliant.

As Knowles shows, in the case of the UK, greater transparency over its role in conflicts would satisfy the public and parliamentary scepticism about arms sales and secret wars.³⁷ According to the UK's *Overseas Justice and Security Assistance: Human Rights Guidance*, arms suppliers must obtain assurance from the host governments that the recipient institution or unit has received training and has standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the use of force and firearms in accordance with international law and standards.³⁸

³⁴ News Report, 'UN: Zero Tolerance for State Who Flout Arms Trade Treaty Obligations', in *Amnesty International*, 22 August 2016, online at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/un-zero-tolerance-for-states-who-flout-arms-trade-treaty-obligations>.

³⁵ Marta Latek, 'The Arms Trade Treaty Finally an outcome and what next?', in *Library Briefing Library of European Parliament* (May 2013), p.5.

³⁶ Paul Holden (ed.), *Indefensible: Seven Myths that Sustain the Global Arms Trade* (Zed Books Ltd., 2016), pp.24-26.

³⁷ Knowles, 'We need to talk about Yemen', p. 1.

³⁸ UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Overseas Security and Justice Assistance*,

A UNIDIR report recommended that to prevent unauthorised use of arms an end use/r statement should be certified or validated by the importing state authorities to show that the non-state importer or end user have received permission to import the controlled items.³⁹

On the other hand, the ATT require some better provisions to ensure its enforcement and monitoring. In her book 'Dangerous Trade', Jennifer Erickson argues that 'practice will remain unchanged if monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to raise the social and material costs of non-compliance continue to be elusive'.⁴⁰ Some very useful guidelines for state parties to control the risk of arms diversion have been given by Sarah Parker in her handbook *Arms Trade Treaty: A Practical Guide to National Implementation*:⁴¹

- *During Transit*: Impose restrictions on shipping agents, brokers, transportation routes and trans-shipment arrangements. Monitor the shipment by physically accompanying it or remotely via satellite.
- *On Delivery*: Verify delivery from the importing state (physical verification by inspectors followed by reporting).
- *Post Delivery and Storage*: Enhance regulatory and control systems within the importing state, ensure end-user and end-use undertakings, institute post-delivery controls; assistance to end user in stockpile security, destruction or responsible disposal of surplus arms and ammunition.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have established a relationship between remote warfare, arms trade, arms misuse or diversion, immigration, terrorism and modern conventional adversary. Recent conflicts testify that all major remote wars have somehow generated a Newtonian by-product – "every action has an equal and opposite

Human Rights Guidance (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2017), p. 18.

³⁹ UNIDIR, 'Strengthening End Use/r Control Systems to Prevent Arms Diversion: Examining Common Regional Understandings', in *UNIDIR Resources* (2017), p.5.

⁴⁰ Jennifer L. Erickson, *Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation* (Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 72.

⁴¹ Parker, 'The Arms Trade Treaty', pp. 124-131.

reaction” – that is, rogue organisations and terrorist networks have emerged in the world’s trouble spots. Arms traded in remote warfare fall into wrong hands due to weak control, poor monitoring or simply deliberately. The arms traded to non-state actors are more dangerous as these actors often have linkages with international terrorist organisations. Arms can be misused by terrorist groups and non-state actors for the purpose of human rights violations.

The horrors of conflict, in turn, create waves of immigration from conflict affected areas into developed countries. In the guise of immigrants, affiliates and members of international terrorist organisations also infiltrate developed countries. The diverted arms of past wars, availability of COTS high tech equipment, exploitable immigrants, and international terrorist organisations combined with the financial and political support of conventional adversaries is a new threat nexus in the making.

The obvious way forward is to regulate and monitor arms transfers in remote warfare and control the misuse and diversion of arms. This will have a significant effect on the reduction of human rights violations in host countries and shall moderate the displacement and migration of people. With the reduction in immigration flows to developed countries, opportunities for international terrorist organisations to ‘cross-pollinate terror’ shall also reduce. This is a call for an overhaul of the remote warfare programme, strict adherence to the ATT, and the enhancement of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms in the global arms trade. Remote warfare must curb terror and not pollinate it.
