

Diplomacy and Intelligence: Friends or Foes? A Comment on the Intelligence-Diplomacy Rivalry

Saawani Raje

Introduction

The relationship between diplomacy and intelligence has been much-debated in international relations. Often, intelligence is pitted as a direct rival to diplomacy, even to the extent of being called 'anti-diplomacy'. Scholars argue that the intelligence community and its activities are often in contravention of the aims and practices of the diplomatic community, which makes it difficult for the two institutions to exist symbiotically.¹ This article contests that thesis, arguing that intelligence is in fact an extension of diplomacy and that any perceived rivalry is purely structural rather than conceptual.

Schematically, the article is organised as follows: it will first examine the definitions of diplomacy and intelligence. It will then explore the relationship between diplomacy and intelligence as tools available to states to fulfil their policy objectives, negating the argument that diplomacy and intelligence are rivals. Through the use of empirical cases as examples, it will highlight the interdependence of the two institutions, positing that intelligence is an extension of diplomacy. Finally, it will seek to explore supposed avenues of diplomatic-intelligence rivalry, arguing that these are overstated and better understood as subtle structural differences.

Defining 'Intelligence' and 'Diplomacy'

¹ See for example James Der Derian, 'Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice', in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1993), pp. 29-51; Michael Herman, 'Diplomacy and Intelligence', in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, no. 2 (2007), pp. 1-22; Len Scott, 'Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy', in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2004), pp. 322-341.

Hedley Bull defines diplomacy as “the conduct of relations between sovereign states with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means”.² In its modern form, the practice of diplomacy has its roots in the late fifteenth century city-states in the Italian peninsula. While its basic purpose was being a tool for states to pursue their foreign policies, it has also long been used as a weapon for information-gathering.³ Geoff Berridge situates this term and its definition further within its historical context: until 1796, when British parliamentarian Edmund Burke first used the label of ‘diplomacy’ for any activities that fell under this definitional umbrella, this practice was known as ‘negotiation’.⁴ Diplomacy can thus be understood as the visible practice of maintaining interstate relations by overwhelmingly peaceful means. Michael Herman expands on these historical underpinnings of diplomacy, calling it “an institution for making and executing policy as well as getting information.”⁵

‘Intelligence’ on the other hand often operates in a relatively more opaque sphere. While the necessity of intelligence-driven information gathering is undisputed, the limits of its ethics, accountability and reach have been a source of much friction in the international community.⁶ Much of this uncertainty stems from the problematic attempts at defining ‘intelligence’. The definitions of ‘intelligence’ are difficult and lack clarity, often to the benefit of states and policymakers who have some stake in keeping the understanding of ‘intelligence’ and all that it encompasses understandably vague.⁷ Der Derian argues that the emergence of the term ‘intelligence’ pertaining to information gathering to enhance a

² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 156.

³ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 34.

⁴ G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 1.

⁵ Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 34.

⁶ See for example: Mark Vincent Vlasic, ‘Cloak and Dagger Diplomacy: The U.S. and Assassination’, in *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2000) pp. 95-104; David Omand, ‘Ethical Guidelines in Using Secret Intelligence for Public Security’, in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2006), pp. 613-628; Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson & Ian Leigh, *Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability* (Potomac Books, 2005); Loch K. Johnson (ed.). *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (Routledge, 2007).

⁷ Der Derian, ‘Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice’, p. 30.

state's security is a relatively recent phenomenon, first appearing in the sixteenth century as part of English and French diplomatic discourse.⁸ However, the understanding of intelligence as mostly covert information-gathering for state security appears much earlier, in 'Arthashastra', an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic and military strategy as well as Sun Tzu's 'Art of War.'⁹

Despite its ancient roots, intelligence as a specialised institution first made its presence felt in the form of military attachés in the early nineteenth century. This need for military attachés was evolved from states' needs to be fully informed about armaments of friends and foes due to advancements in science and technology transforming the art and the practice of war.¹⁰ The appointment of these attachés laid the foundation for the emergence of specialist organisations or forces whose only function was information gathering and analysis, a rudimentary blueprint for intelligence agencies today. One of the earliest examples of military attachés was in 1806, when Napoleon made an army Captain a second secretary of the French embassy at Vienna to keep a watch on the strength of the Austrian army. This practice then spread to the rest of Europe in the second half of the century, with attachés often being used to facilitate co-operation between the Great Powers in war situations. These attachés eventually became permanent members of embassy staff as technical experts who could keep their governments informed about strategic and military developments abroad.¹¹

Historical evolution notwithstanding, the modern definitions of intelligence are numerous. Rarely do these definitions build off one another, or are compelling enough in themselves.¹² A notably vague definition is by the CIA, which defines intelligence as "*the knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us*".¹³ Sherman Kent's definition situates intelligence within the governmental civil-military

⁸ Ibid., p. 30.

⁹ See Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, trsl. by R. Shamasastri (Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1915); Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, trsl. by L. Giles (Luzac & Co., 1910).

¹⁰ Keith Hamilton & Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Theory, Evolution and Administration* (Routledge, 1995).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Michael Warner, 'Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence' in *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2007), online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html> (Last accessed 6 May 2019).

¹³ Central Intelligence Agency Office of Public Affairs, *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence* (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. vii.

sphere: “*Intelligence is....the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare.*”¹⁴ Another definition by Abram Shulsky, writing under the pseudonym H. A. Random focuses on the centrality of secrecy within intelligence: “*Intelligence is the official, secret collection and processing of information on foreign countries to aid in formulating and implementing foreign policy, and the conduct of covert activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy.*”¹⁵ Thus, definitional difficulties and historical ambiguity in their functions are significant in debates about the diplomacy-intelligence relationship.

*Intelligence as an extension of diplomacy:
Contesting the ‘anti-diplomacy’ thesis*

In his seminal paper on the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy, James Der Derian conceptualises intelligence as the displacement and continuation of international conflict by *anti-diplomatic* means.¹⁶

Michael Herman casts a more conciliatory tone, arguing that Western intelligence is less of a rival to diplomacy than has been portrayed by the “anti-diplomacy” camp. Despite this view, he too recognises the sharp differentiation between the two institutions. However, a brief exploration of the historical interaction between the two institutions reveals a significant overlap.

Long before the appointments of the first military attachés, civil diplomats had been embroiled in all types of bribery and deception.¹⁷ “*Diplomacy*”, according to one scholar, “*evolved as governments’ institution for gathering foreign intelligence, with its conduct, privileges and ceremonial recognized in the seventeenth century.*”¹⁸ This diplomatic service was supported by a network of overseas correspondents that had varying degree of clandestinity.

The example of military attachés being responsible for facilitating cooperation between Great Powers in war situations as

¹⁴ Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1949), p. vii.

¹⁵ R.A. Random, ‘Intelligence as Science’ in *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1958), p. 76. Also see Warner, ‘Wanted’.

¹⁶ Der Derian, ‘Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice’, p. 32.

¹⁷ Hamilton & Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*.

¹⁸ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, p. 34.

mentioned above also highlights the commonalities between the diplomatic and intelligence institutions— that an institution which specifically evolved as a form of modern intelligence agencies actually undertook classic diplomatic functions. The diplomacy-intelligence separation and subsequent rivalry thus seems to be overstated if the origins of both institutions are examined. However, this does not mean that there are no distinctions between the institutions of diplomacy and intelligence.

One of the fundamental differences between intelligence and diplomacy lies in the legitimacy that the international system accords to diplomats. The Vienna Convention establishes the functions of a diplomatic mission as “ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State”.¹⁹ According to Michael Herman, who is one of the foremost scholars of intelligence-diplomacy studies, diplomats in practice are front-door people in the international system, while intelligence as an institution has no more than ‘tacit international recognition’.²⁰ This insinuates that diplomacy and intelligence always co-exist in two different spheres of legitimacy, which pushes them further apart as two separate entities.

However, this paper argues that in the post-9/11 international system, intelligence has acquired a new legitimacy. Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001 called upon all states to “find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information”²¹ This gave intelligence new legitimacy in the international system, with increasing budgets spent on enhancing intelligence-gathering capacities— for example, in 2014, Britain spent a twentieth of its cost of defence on intelligence, while America spent a tenth of its defence cost on intelligence. Both these amounts are greater than what these states spend on diplomacy— an argument often used to highlight the rivalry between these two institutions, with intelligence being said to significantly reduce the importance of diplomacy.

This distinction between intelligence and diplomacy leads on to another very important distinction that is part of academic debates surrounding this topic, which is the difference between the functions that diplomacy and intelligence are said to fulfil. Most scholars

¹⁹ The Vienna Convention (1961), Article 3,1.d

²⁰ Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’, p. 6.

²¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), 3.e

writing about intelligence opine that unlike diplomacy, the essence of intelligence as an institution is providing information and forecasts for others to act on.²² It is not a decision-taking or executive institution. Diplomacy on the other hand is responsible for making and executing policy as well as getting information, a role that it enjoys as its preserve to this day. However, in the post-World War II world that was slowly witnessing the emergence of the Cold War, “the distinctions between diplomacy and espionage, and between espionage and covert military operations, were....steadily eroded in a new world of institutionalised and professionalised secrecy.”²³ Thus, the gap between diplomacy and intelligence that existed in terms of the roles they needed to fill, is gradually disappearing.

This can be illustrated through an example of the ‘Special Relationship’ that existed between Britain and the United States in the decade after the Second World War ended. This strong alliance between the two nations was characterised by the sharing of intelligence on an unprecedented level. Firstly, most Post-war short-term policies as well as long-term strategic decisions in the West were strongly influenced by these shared high-level intelligence assessments.²⁴ In this particular case, intelligence did go beyond its mandate of merely collecting information and entered the jurisdiction of diplomacy pertaining to the formation and implementation of executive policy. For example in 1948, officials in both London and Washington had decided upon a programme of covert action designed to destabilise the Eastern Bloc. However, the British intelligence and information about the Soviet atomic capability made Britain increasingly conscious of its vulnerability and led to reluctance on its part to carry through with any liberation or destabilising policy. This divergence in intelligence decisions mirrored broader Anglo-American disagreements over pursuing détente as a foreign policy during early and mid-1950s.²⁵

Another distinction between intelligence and diplomacy relates to the method of collecting information by intelligence services as opposed to the diplomats. Herman argues that the methods of intelligence collection are on the whole distinctive, for

²² For a detailed discussion, see Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’.

²³ Hamilton & Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, p. 192.

²⁴ Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold War’, in *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1998), p. 332.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

example cipher-breaking and imagery interpretation.²⁶ It is opined that there are two ways to get classified knowledge— honestly, through conversations with journalists, officials, politicians and publications, and clandestinely through bribery, cryptanalysis and employment of secret agents and devices.²⁷

While the preserve of honest information gathering is regarded as the legitimate function of a diplomat, any supply of knowledge by clandestine means is considered espionage.²⁸ The central feature of clandestine intelligence gathering is said to be the collection of information without the targets' consent or cooperation, and often without the targets' knowledge. Highlighting the opacity surrounding this activity, Herman posits that states give their consent to the existence of diplomats and diplomatic reporting, but not to intelligence sources.²⁹ The practice of clandestine diplomacy, however, weakens this argument. Clandestine diplomacy, according to the scholar Len Scott is an activity undertaken by secret intelligence services where deniable communication between adversaries may be helpful.³⁰ This form of diplomacy may overlap with gathering intelligence and/or conducting deception, but with a motive to influence the adversary.³¹ In this kind of activity, intelligence agents themselves are primary actors for fulfilling diplomatic aims. This is often to accord nations with the plausible deniability required to fulfil certain diplomatic aims, as was in the case of the US-UK-Libya talks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Metter argues that in the case of these talks, the intelligence community formed the basis of the diplomatic machinery used by these nations for various reasons— mainly to circumvent domestic and bureaucratic inhibitors and to maximise the maintenance of secrecy.³² Additionally, the volatile nature of the issue meant that secrecy and plausible deniability was crucial for these negotiations, as is often the case in such situations which prompt the use of

²⁶ Herman, *Intelligence Power*.

²⁷ Hamilton & Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, p. 192.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Herman, *Intelligence Power*.

³⁰ Scott, 'Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy', p. 336.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Nils Metter, 'A Case for Clandestine Diplomacy: The Secret UK-US-Libyan Talks', in *The Yale Review of International Studies* (June 2015), online at <http://yris.yira.org/essays/1553> (Last accessed 6 May 2019).

clandestine diplomacy. Another example will serve to highlight this point further.

The Cuba missile crisis of 1962 was a major crisis which saw a significant amount of clandestine diplomacy being practiced. This eventually played a crucial role in averting a major conflict. The role of Aleksandr Feklisov, the KGB 'Rezident' in Washington can be analysed as that of a quintessential clandestine diplomat. At the height of the crisis, he contacted an American journalist, John Scali, who then conveyed to the State Department an outline deal to facilitate the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. This assisted the de-escalation of this crisis.³³ Thus, the covertness which is the usual preserve of the intelligence community was also used in diplomatic efforts and diplomacy in the above examples. Conversely, in the post-9/11 world, intrusive collection methods that intelligence agencies have been known to traditionally use, have become far more acceptable in the international system in order to meet policy goals.³⁴ The bridging of this gap between traditional notions of intelligence and diplomacy adds considerable value to the argument that intelligence and diplomacy further each other's functioning, rather than being rivals or antithetical to each other.

Another way in which intelligence assists diplomacy in fulfilling foreign policy goals is by having better access to non-state actors, especially in terms of defence and security. The international system today is composed of a combination of states and powerful non-state actors, such as major terrorist groups. In such situations, diplomacy as an established channel of communication between two states is left restricted and it is intelligence that provides access to actors that lie beyond the realms of established diplomatic boundaries. The killing of Osama bin Laden that was planned through intelligence channels, with diplomatic channels having limited influence over the matter, highlights how intelligence complements diplomacy in achieving national goals, rather than being a rival.

The relationship between intelligence and diplomacy works the opposite way, too. Intelligence needs and regularly uses the cover that diplomacy provides in order to carry out usually covert assignments. Intelligence officers take cover in embassies abroad in

³³ Scott, 'Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy', p. 333.

³⁴ Michael Herman, '11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?', in *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), p. 232.

order to maximise their chance of collecting information. Conversely, embassies are targeted by intelligence services of other states. The British Embassy in Washington played a very important role in handling an 'overwhelming bulk' of Anglo-American relations in the Post-War years.³⁵ As Michael Hopkins opines, "*The principal vehicle for inserting opinions and recommendations in pursuit of the government's two goals of continued partnership as an equal and of material assistance was the Washington Embassy- together with its network of offices around the country.*"³⁶ Diplomats and intelligence officers in the Washington embassy worked together towards the same goals and in a similar manner to each other. This collaboration illustrates the complexity of the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy, which cannot be classified as antithetical, or rival.

At the same time, the work of the intelligence services was facilitated by any personal relations cultivated by diplomats. Talking about the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship', Hopkins adds that the personal relationship between the British Ambassador and the US Secretary of State played a very important role in Anglo-American cooperation.³⁷

According to Michael Herman, another distinction between diplomacy and intelligence is that of its subjects.³⁸ According to him, intelligence and diplomacy have different weights when different subjects are of concern. The jurisdiction of each institution makes clear the weight that each institutions' concerns and priorities carry. For example, intelligence could have greater authority on subjects like a certain conflict, violence or questions of security, while diplomacy draws authority on subjects like political situations or the perceptions of a host country. What is significant to consider however is that despite this apparent division in jurisdiction, both intelligence and diplomacy *complement* rather than rival each other in fulfilling a common goal— that presented by the state as its policy aim.

Diplomacy is also an occasional customer of intelligence as an institution.³⁹ Diplomats use information provided by intelligence to assist them in policymaking, threat perception or their own security.

³⁵ Richard J. Aldrich & Michael F. Hopkins (eds.), *Intelligence, Defence, and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-war World* (F. Cass, 1994)

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Herman, 'Diplomacy and Intelligence'.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Intelligence also gives confirmatory value to information gathered by diplomats. This, again, fortifies the view of intelligence and diplomacy working in tandem, with intelligence helping diplomacy to extend and maximise its reach.

At its core, intelligence and diplomacy cannot be rivals as neither has the levels of power or influence on its own as it does when the two institutions work in tandem towards a common goal supplementing each other's work. For example, intelligence was only one pillar of the Anglo-American Special relationship, and no doubt would have been unable to fulfil its proposed objectives without the involvement and cooperation of the Washington Embassy. Intelligence here was thus a tool that shaped inter-state relations to an extent, but as an extension of the diplomatic arm of the state.

Thus, the fundamental functions of intelligence and diplomacy converge, fulfilling the same broad aims with similar legitimacy. Rather than a threat, the evolution of intelligence as an equal player in the international system therefore situates it as an annex to the institution of diplomacy. In fact, Martin Wight stresses that espionage and diplomacy are both components of the international system in addition to other international institutions which together yield "a modicum of order and intelligibility in international relations."⁴⁰

The Intelligence-Diplomacy 'rivalry':

It is difficult to see intelligence and diplomacy in their conception as institutions, to be intense rivals of each other. However, when the work done by diplomats and intelligence officers is examined, it can be argued that there is scope for structural and jurisdictional differences which gets attributed to a deeper fundamental rivalry between the two institutions. This is because both— the intelligence services and diplomats— have been originally created to perform very similar functions: they need to collect information about the country they are posted in and act on it in a way that helps to maintain peace between the two states. Despite this common purpose, both organisations differ in their sphere of influence and command structure. For example in the UK, diplomats answer to the Foreign Office while Intelligence officers follow a completely

⁴⁰ Der Derian, 'Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice', p. 34.

different chain of command. This is fertile ground for personal or organisational differences purely at a structural level, neither tantamount to a fundamental deep-running antipathy insinuated in the use of terms such as 'antidiplomacy'.

Further, diplomats face the potential threat of professional overreach by intelligence agencies, leading to a perception of competition between the two agencies. For example, Edward Korry, the US ambassador in Santiago was not informed when in 1970, the CIA used the diplomatic bag to supply arms to opponents of Chile's Marxist President. Multiple instances like these only serve to intensify rivalries between the two establishments. Another factor that plays up professional friction between intelligence officers and diplomats is the general belief or the sense of pride amongst diplomats that they are generalists and they can understand other countries better than can specialised intelligence officers. This raises tensions between diplomats and intelligence officers, especially in areas where intelligence officers' long-term predictions may contradict the diplomats' own assessment of events and situations.⁴¹

On a more systemic scale, the growing need for governments to gather increasingly extensive intelligence has affected the lives of diplomats. Information collection has put professional diplomats in contact with the security services of other governments, which not only is away from their original sphere of work, but also runs a risk of being identified with the forces of repression.⁴² In a blog interview, Shawn Kobb, an American diplomat working in Kabul highlighted that one of the biggest misconception he has faced about his job is people mistaking him for an intelligence officer or spy, which placed him in danger in a hostile place like Kabul. This added dimension of danger increases antagonistic feeling between intelligence and diplomacy at the level of the professional actors in each institution.

In addition to the above difficulties, tit-for-tat expulsions of embassy staff after unmasking of spy rings can impede the efficient functioning of missions that diplomats are responsible for, and interfere with otherwise legitimate activities they may undertake.⁴³ This constant danger of being unmasked leads to diplomats looking at intelligence officers as additional obstacles to their professional life.

⁴¹ Robert Jervis, 'Intelligence and Foreign Policy: A Review Essay', in *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1986), pp. 141-161.

⁴² Hamilton & Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Rivalry can be seen to exist between professionals involved in diplomacy and intelligence. However, it seems to be a manifestation of regular professional rivalries in any organisation, akin to inter-services rivalry in the armed forces of any state. In fact, this strong rivalry between individuals in the two institutions can be taken as a sign of the extent of close contact between the two institutions as a whole, supporting the thesis that intelligence could be seen an extension of diplomacy.

Conclusion

On basis of the above arguments, we can conclude that intelligence and diplomacy differ in terms of their everyday functions. However, historically speaking, both these institutions share the same functional roots. A quote from Richard Longhorn and Keith Hamilton succinctly sums it up: "*As purveyors of advice and information, diplomats have by definition long been involved in intelligence-gathering of a kind... an 'honourable spy'.*"⁴⁴ Therefore, rather than being a rival to diplomacy, intelligence bolsters its functioning, influence, and effectiveness.

The distinction between the two institutions in terms of their methods of operation is obvious and can be deceiving. The existence and acceptance of clandestine diplomacy, and the increased legitimisation of covert intelligence collection in the post-9/11 world shows that the gap between intelligence and diplomacy has been considerably overstated. Diplomacy has been evolving, while still retaining in part its original function of collecting information. The relationship between the two institutions as a producer and consumer of information, and the opinion that they give each other confirmatory value make it further apparent how they are an extension of each other, especially with intelligence extending its reach to areas that diplomacy cannot cover.

This is most true when dealing with non-state actors, where intelligence has a relatively free reign over its access to them. At the same time, intelligence's need for the institutional backing that diplomacy provides in the form of embassies sidelines the argument that the increasing importance of intelligence is reducing the value of the diplomatic institution. The type of rivalry between diplomacy and intelligence that is most prominent is between diplomats and

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 189.

intelligence officers as professionals, or as two departments that are in fact extension of each other in theory. This rivalry does not seem enough for intelligence to be called 'anti-diplomacy'.

To reiterate, this paper has thus argued that intelligence is an extension of diplomacy (the institution as a whole), and not the antithesis to what diplomacy stands for. Based on this thesis, it can also be proposed that the position of intelligence vis-à-vis diplomacy today can be seen as the evolution of diplomacy into a multipurpose institution with an ever-increasing mandate to meet the needs of a changing international system. Intelligence and diplomacy are therefore not rivals or competitors, but add-ons to each other, with each institution facilitating the other.
